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Abstract: Problem statement: Autonomous decision making and resource scheduling are the main 
objectives of market-life computational grid. Resource providers and consumers make the scheduling 
decisions with cost and incentive factors. The two objectives are to maximize the success rate of job 
execution and to minimize fairness deviation among resources. The challenge is to develop a grid-
scheduling scheme that enables individual participants to make autonomous decision while producing 
a desirable emergent property in the grid system. Approach: An incentive-based scheduling scheme is 
presented  to  utilize  a  peer-to-peer  decentralized  scheduling  framework  a  set  of  local  heuristic 
algorithms and three  market instruments of job announcement, price and competition degree. The 
incentive based scheme is enhanced with priority based pricing schemes. The resource availability, job 
priority and network delay are used for the cost and incentive decisions. Results: The performance of 
this  scheme is evaluated  via extensive simulation using  synthetic and real  workloads. The system 
achieves efficient cost and incentive optimization for both providers and consumers. Conclusion: The 
approach  outperforms  other  scheduling  schemes  in  optimizing  incentives  for  both  consumers  and 
providers, leading to highly successful job execution and fair profit allocation. 
 
Key words: Computational grids, economic scheduling, resource sharing, provider and consumer 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  Grid computing, which aims at enabling wide-area 
resource  sharing  and  collaboration,  is  emerging  as  a 
promising  distributed  computing  paradigm  (Parashar 
and Lee, 2005). Based on how computational jobs are 
scheduled  to  resources,  computational  grids  can  be 
classified  into  two  types:  controlled  and  market-like 
grids. Both the types involve sharing and collaboration 
among resource providers and resource consumers and 
the  scheduling  schemes  can  be  either  centralized  or 
decentralized. The key difference between the two lies in 
who makes scheduling decisions. In a controlled grid, the 
grid system decides when to execute which job on which 
resource. In a market-like grid, such decisions are made by 
each  resource  provider/consumer,  but  all  the  individual 
participants utilize some market instruments such as price 
to achieve the grid system wide objectives. 
  This  work  focuses  on  the  scheduling  problem  in 
market  like  computational  grids.  In  particular,  it 
addresses the issues of optimizing incentives for both 
resource  consumers  and  resource  providers  so  that 
every  participant  has  sufficient  incentive  to  stay  and 
play,  leading  to  a  sustainable  market.  The  main 
challenge,  phrased  as  a  scheduling  problem,  is  to 
schedule jobs of consumers to resources of providers to 
optimize incentives for both parties. Most importantly, 
such objectives should be realized not by an omnipotent 
scheduler, but rather, the scheduling scheme should be 
autonomous. That is, each participant makes decisions 
on  its  own  behalf  and  the  individual  economic 
behaviors  of  all  participants  work  together  to 
accomplish  resource  scheduling,  with  optimized 
incentives  being  an  emergent  property  of  the  grid 
system. Does such a scheme exist at all? The answer 
is not obvious. 
  Formulation of the above scheduling problem and 
investigation of market instruments and algorithms are 
done. Identification of the successful-execution rate of 
jobs as the incentive for consumers and the inverse of 
fairness  deviation  as  the  incentive  for  providers  is 
made.  As  even  a  sub  problem  of  the  formulated 
scheduling  problem  is  NP-complete,  we  develop  a 
scheduling scheme (called IB) using local heuristics is 
done.  Job  announcement,  Competition  Degree  (CD) 
and price are defined and used as market instruments. 
Four heuristic algorithms, local to each participant, are 
developed  to  utilize  the  market  instruments  and  to 
optimize  the  incentives.  Performance  evaluation  is 
conducted  via  extensive  simulations,  utilizing  both J. Computer Sci., 8 (4): 538-544, 2012 
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statistically  generated  workloads  and  real  workloads. 
The  results  show  that  the  proposed  IB  scheme 
outperforms other schemes in optimizing incentives for 
both consumers and providers. 
 
Problem  formulation:  We  define  a  market-like 
computational grid as a quadruple G= (R, S, J, M). The 
grid G consists of a set of m resource providers R = 
{R0,..., Rm-1} and a set of k resource consumers S = 
{S0 .... Sk-1}. Over a time period T, a set of n jobs J = 
{J0,., Jn-1} are submitted to the grid by the consumers, 
scheduled by the scheduling scheme M and executed by 
resources of the providers. The scheduling scheme M 
should  employ  market  instruments  to  allow  each 
provider  and  each  consumer  to  make  the  scheduling 
decision autonomously. That is, each provider Ri can 
decide  whether  it  would  offer  its  resource  and  each 
consumer Sj can decide whether it would use a certain 
resource to execute its jobs. 
 
Consumers  and  jobs:  In  this  work,  computation-
intensive  jobs  are  considered  and  all 
communication/networking overheads are ignored. All 
jobs  are  independent  of  one  another  (Padala  et  al., 
2003).  The  k  consumers  altogether  have  n  jobs  to 
execute in time period T. The consumers first submit 
job  announcements  to  the  computational  grid.  A  job 
announcement  includes  the  information  of  job  length 
and  job  deadline.  Job  length  is  an  empirical  value 
assessed  as  the  execution  time  of  the  job  on  a 
designated  standard  platform.  Job  deadline  is  a  wall 
clock  time  by  which  a  consumer  desires  a  job  to  be 
finished, expressed as a number between 0 and T. Thus, 
a job with length = 10 and deadline = 100 means that 
the job’s execution takes 10 time units on a designated 
standard  computer  and  it  must  be  finished  100  time 
units after the common base time 0. 
 
Providers  and  resources:  From  the  scheduling 
viewpoint, each resource provider is modeled with three 
parameters:  capability,  job  queue  and  unit  price. 
Capability is the computational speed of the underlying 
resource, expressed as a multiple of the speed of the 
standard platform. The job queue of a resource provider 
keeps  an  ordered  set  of  jobs  scheduled  but  not  yet 
executed. Each job, once it is executed on a resource, 
will run in a dedicated mode on that resource, without 
time-sharing or preempting. A provider charges for a 
job according to its unit price and job length. Unit price 
refers to the price that the resource offers for executing 
a job of unit length. When a provider with capability 5 
bids to execute a job of length 20 at a unit price of 2 
and if the consumer accepts the bid and decides to send 
the job to run there, the job will take 20/5 = 4 units of 
time to complete, generating a profit of 2´20 = 40 for 
the provider. 
 
Incentives for consumers and providers: Intuitively, 
consumers are attracted to a grid, because it offers high 
quality of computational service at low cost. This could 
lead to many potential metrics of consumer incentives. 
However, a fundamental incentive requirement is that a 
grid  should  have  a  high  successful-execution  rate  of 
jobs, where a successful job execution means that a job 
is executed without missing its deadline. When this rate 
is too low, even if the cost is zero (as in the case when a 
grid  is  advertising  funded),  the  consumers  will  lose 
faith in the grid and quit it. Therefore, we choose the 
successful-execution  rate  of  the  grid  system  as  the 
incentive for consumers. 
 
Related work: Much attention has been devoted to the 
area of scheduling in distributed computing (Lai et al., 
2005). However, to the best of our knowledge, there is 
still  no  work  investigating  effective  scheduling  to 
optimize incentives for both consumers and providers, 
utilizing  market  information.  Many  previous  research 
projects focused on optimizing traditional performance 
metrics,  like  system  utilization,  system  load  balance 
and application response time in controlled grids. They 
did  not  consider  market-like  grids,  where  providing 
sufficient incentives for participants is a key issue. 
  Enterprise is a task scheduler for distributed market 
like  computing  environments.  The  work  shows  the 
effectiveness  of  a  bidding  model  for  a  decentralized 
scheduling  framework.  Spawn  is  a  market-based 
computational  system  that  utilizes  idle  computational 
resources  in  a  distributed  network  of  heterogeneous 
computer  workstations.  The  auctions  employed  by 
Spawn are sealed-bid second-price auctions. Buyya et 
al. (2005) identify the distributed resource management 
challenges  and  requirements  of  economy-based  grid 
systems  and  discuss  various  representative  economy-
based  systems.  They  also  present  commodity  and 
auction models for resource allocation (Abdelkader et 
al., 2008). The evaluation results of computational and 
data grid environments demonstrate the effectiveness of 
economic models in meeting users’ QoS requirements 
(Abdelkader  et  al.,  2009).  A  consumer  initiated  bid 
model is chosen in this work. 
  CompuP2P (Gupta et al., 2006) is an architecture 
for  enabling  Internet  computing,  using  Peer-To-Peer 
(P2P) networks for sharing of computing resources. The 
work focuses on modeling pricing with the game theory 
and microeconomics to deal with selfish behavior and 
proves that its model guarantee the incentive for all the 
providers to share resources and not to cheat. J. Computer Sci., 8 (4): 538-544, 2012 
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  Enterprise tries minimizing the completion time of 
jobs. Spawn aims at the fairness of resource allocation: 
the number of CPU slots bought is proportional to the 
amount  of  funding.  Nimrod/G  is  a  resource 
management  and  scheduling  system  based  on  the 
parameter  sweeping  system.  Nimrod  and  Nimrod/G 
built with Globus toolkit. Resources can be associated 
with prices and jobs can be given budgets. The authors 
do not focus on economic feature and give no further 
explanation and implementation of their economic idea 
over  Nimrod/G.  Libra  (Sherwani  et  al.,  2004)  is  an 
expansion  of  Nimrod/G  for  cluster  computing.  Its 
objective is to maximize the successful-execution rate 
under  the  constraint  of  budget.  Performance  evaluation 
shows  its  improvement  in  the  rate  of  accepted  jobs 
compared  with  FIFO.  Unlike  most  related  work  that 
considers  performance  objective  only  for  resource 
consumers,  First  Reward  (Irwin  et  al.,  2004),  a  value-
based heuristic task scheduling scheme for a market based 
grid setting, tries maximizing the profits of providers. 
  Partial results of our incentive-based scheduling work 
are reported in (Zhu et al., 2004; Xiao et al., 2005).  Zhu et 
al. (2004) consumers assign budgets to jobs and choose 
providers according to the claimed completion time. No 
price or CD mechanisms are investigated. In (Xiao et al., 
2005), the impact of CD is studied. It does not formulate 
the dual-objective scheduling problem, develop a complete 
scheduling  scheme,  evaluate  performance  in  detail,  or 
provide  quantitative  comparison  with  related  work,  as 
what the current work does. 
 
The  incentive-based  scheduling  scheme:  An 
incentive-based  scheduling  scheme  IB  is  proposed 
here  with  heuristics,  employing  a  P2P  decentralized 
scheduling framework. The scheme is characterized as 
follows: (1) Each consumer or provider autonomously 
makes  scheduling  decisions,  (2)  All  scheduling 
algorithms  are  local  to  a  resource  provider  and  (3) 
Three  market  instruments,  job  announcement,  price 
and CD, are used. 
 
Peer-to-Peer scheduling framework: Our scheduling 
framework  takes  advantage  of  the  P2P  technology, 
utilizing  its  characteristics  of  decentralization  and 
scalability.  A  central  server  is  far  from  robust  and  the 
maintenance is costly. Apart from that, as every participant 
in  the  computational  grid  is  autonomous  and  acts 
individually. A decentralized scheduling infrastructure is 
more favorable. Furthermore, owing to the dynamics of 
grid environments, players may enter or leave at any time. 
A P2P network can handle such dynamics. 
  The computational grid G has several portals, via one 
of which a provider can join the grid. On entering, the 
provider  gets  the  information  of  designated  neighbors 
from the portal and then connects into the P2P network. 
  A  consumer  submits  a  job  announcement  to  the 
computational  grid  via  one  portal.  Then,  the  job 
announcement  spreads  throughout  the  P2P  network, 
similar  to  query  broadcast  in  an  unstructured  P2P 
system. The providers that receive a job announcement 
may  bid  for  the  job.  Realization  of  the  complete 
competition  among  all  the  providers  based  on  two 
considerations is desired. Firstly, the job execution time 
is sufficiently long such that the overhead of executing 
them  on  remote  computers  becomes  relatively 
negligible. Thus, all the providers should have an equal 
chance to compete for any job, without considering the 
geographical  locations.  Secondly,  the  number  of 
providers will not be too large, (typically not more than 
several  hundred),  for  a  provider  represents  an 
administrative  domain,  within  which  local  scheduling 
policies  are  employed.  It  is  well  known  that  blind-
flooding-based  broadcasting  is  a  fatal  weakness  of 
unstructured P2P networks. Many investigators (Liu et al., 
2004)  have  studied  building  overlay  networks,  whose 
topology  closely  matches  the  topology  of  physical 
networks.  Once  an  overlay  network  with  the  desirable 
characteristic is built, an efficient broadcasting mechanism 
with good performance can be constructed. 
  The  P2P  scheduling  infrastructure  enables  the 
effective interactions between consumers and providers 
and jobs are scheduled as a result. Scheduling scheme 
of  steps  is  that  a  single  job  goes  through  in  the 
scheduling scheme M. All jobs from consumers follow 
the same steps: 
 
Step 1: A consumer submits a job announcement to the 
computational grid and the job announcement is 
broadcast to all the providers. 
Step 2: Each  provider,  upon  receiving  a  job 
announcement,  estimates  whether  it  is  able  to 
meet the deadline of the job. If yes, the provider 
sends a bid that contains the price for the job 
directly  back  to  the  consumer;  otherwise,  the 
provider ignores the job announcement. 
Step 3: After waiting for a certain time, the consumer 
processes  all  the  bids  received,  chooses  the 
provider who charges the least and sends the job 
to the selected provider. 
Step 4: The provider who receives the job inserts it into 
its  job  queue.  When  the  job  is  finished,  the 
provider sends the result to the consumer. 
 
  The value of the parameter-waiting interval in step 
3 should try not to miss any potential bid and also to 
make decisions as soon as possible. In the experiments 
conducted in this work, the average execution time is J. Computer Sci., 8 (4): 538-544, 2012 
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chosen as the waiting interval for synthetic workloads 
and 10 sec for real workloads. 
  Both  are  rather conservative  values  so  that  the 
performance evaluation results will not be favorably 
skewed. 
 
Incentive-based scheduling algorithms: The incentive 
based scheduling algorithm is designed with the criteria 
such  as  job  levels,  local  schedule  information  and 
dynamic price assignment. Four algorithms have been 
designed in this work for providers. The job competing 
algorithm describes how a provider bids when receiving 
a  job  announcement  in  step  2.  The  heuristic  local 
scheduling  algorithm  is  responsible  for  arranging  the 
execution order of jobs in the job queue of a provider. It 
starts  when  a  provider  receives  a  job  in  step  4.  The 
price-adjusting  algorithm  and  the  CD-adjusting 
algorithm help a provider in dynamically adjusting its 
unit  price  and  CD  properly  over  the  period  of  its 
participation in the computational grid. 
 
Job  competing  algorithm:  As  a  result  of  the 
decentralized  scheduling  framework,  providers  make 
decisions  based  on  local,  imperfect  and  delayed 
information, which often puts them in a dilemma. 
  Things  get  more  complex  when  more  jobs  are 
involved. There are two extreme attitudes for providers 
to compete for jobs. One is aggressive. It means that a 
provider  never  considers  the  unconfirmed  jobs  when 
estimating whether it is able to meet job deadline. This 
is a risky one, but chances often accompany risks. The 
other is conservative. It means that a provider always 
keeps  the  unconfirmed  jobs  in  the  job  queue  for 
consideration for a certain time. This attitude will never 
lead to deadline missing but may lose potential chances 
and, thus, profits. Different  competition attitudes  will 
result in different allocations of profits. To study the 
impact  of  competition  attitude,  a  parameter  by  name 
CD is defined a real number from 0-1. A provider will 
insert  unconfirmed  jobs  into  its  job  queue  at  the 
probability of 1-CD. 
  Every  time  a  provider  receives  a  job 
announcement,  it  starts  the  job  competing  algorithm. 
The algorithm is stated as follows: Its time complexity 
is O(q), where q is the number of jobs in the job queue: 
 
Step 1: The provider estimates whether it is able to  
    meet the job deadline. 
Step 2: The provider offers a price for the job.  
 
  The pseudo code is given as follows: 
 
1 price ¬ p*Ls; 
2 if reordered then 
3 price ¬c * 
4 endif 
  Here, p is the unit price of the provider, Ls is the 
job length of job s and c is a decimal slightly larger 
than 1. When the variable reordered is set to true, the 
price is raised. Generally, jobs are enquired in the order 
of their arrival. To meet job deadlines, some jobs may 
be inserted into the job queue ahead of foregoing jobs, 
which  indicates  that  the  deadlines  of  these  jobs  are 
somewhat tight and the jobs need to be given higher 
priority. Thus, it is reasonable to charge more for them. 
On the other side, a tight deadline also increases the 
possibility of failing to meet it. Providers raise the price 
to reduce the chance of being chosen to some extent. 
 
Step 3: The provider sends the price as a bid and inserts 
the  job  at  the  place  that  the  variable  insert  place 
indicates  at  the  probability  of  1-CD.  If  the  provider 
chooses  to  insert  and  the  job  does  not  come  after  a 
certain time, it deletes the job from its job queue. The 
duration of keeping an unconfirmed job should be as 
short as possible but long enough to guarantee not to 
delete offered jobs. 
 
Heuristic  local  scheduling  algorithm:  Once  the 
penalty model is introduced, providers must take some 
measures to minimize the loss. What a provider can do 
is  to  arrange  the  execution  order  of  jobs  in  its  job 
queue. We call it local scheduling. On calculating the 
penalty of all the possible permutations of jobs to find 
out  the  one  with  the  least  penalty  is  NP-complete,  a 
heuristic approach is applied. The approach is based on 
the heuristic rule that when a job is inserted, the relative 
order  of  the  jobs  in  the  origin  queue  is  unchanged. 
Every time a provider is offered a job that is not kept in 
the  job  queue,  it  starts  the  heuristic  local  scheduling 
algorithm.  The  algorithm  is  needless  for  providers 
whose  CD  is  equal  to  0,  because  they  always  keep 
unconfirmed  jobs.  The  heuristic  local  scheduling 
algorithm is described with the following pseudocode. 
Its time complexity is O (q2): 
 
1 insert_place ¬Pq; 
2 penalty ¬ calculate the penalty of inserting the job at 
Pq; 
3 for I ¬ q - 1-0 do 
4 penaltyi calculate the penalty of inserting the job at Pi; 
5 if penaltyi < penalty then 
6 penalty ¬ penaltyi; 
7 insert_place ¬ Pi; 
8 end if 
9 end for 
10 insert the job at insert_place J. Computer Sci., 8 (4): 538-544, 2012 
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Price-adjusting  algorithm:  As  our  performance 
objective for providers is the fair allocation of profits, it 
involves all the providers. It is almost impossible to be 
realized  if  every  provider  just  behaves  based  on  the 
local information. Inevitably, all the providers need to 
know some global information. In the algorithm of this 
work,  it  is  assumed  that  every  provider  is  informed 
with the aggregated capability of all the providers in 
the  computational  grid.  The  information  can  be 
acquired when a provider enters the grid via a portal 
and  is  updated  in  the  same  way  that  a  job 
announcement is forwarded. 
  In a certain period of time, every commodity has 
a predominant price in the market. For a commodity 
like CPU cycles, such a price is easier to determine, 
because commodities of this kind do not have great 
difference  in  quality.  We  call  the  price  as  market 
price  and  it  acts  as  a  directive.  When  entering  the 
grid, a provider gets the market price from a portal 
and sets it as the initial unit price. Then, every time a 
provider is offered a job or deletes an unconfirmed 
job,  it  starts  the  price-adjusting  algorithm.  The 
algorithm is stated as the following pseudocode and 
the time complexity of this algorithm is O (1): 
 
1 r1¬Lo/LT 
2  j 0 j m r2 C/ C
£ 〈 ¬ ∑  
3 if offered a job then 
4 if r1 > r2 and p <= PM then 
5 p ¬a*p; 
6 end if 
7 else // delete an unconfirmed job 
8 if r1 < r2 and p >= PM then 
9 p¬b*p 
10 endif 
11 endif 
 
LO, which is the offered job length, is the aggregated 
length of jobs offered to the provider. LT, which is the 
total job length, is the aggregated length of jobs whose 
announcements are received by the provider.  j 0 j mC
£ 〈 ∑  
is  the  aggregated  capability  of  all  the  providers.  The 
offered job length and the total job length rewind when 
the total capability is updated. In addition, C and p are 
the  capability  and  unit  price  of  the  provider, 
respectively,  PM  is  the  market  price,  α  is  a  decimal 
above 1 and b is a positive decimal under 1. The price-
adjusting mechanism in this work simple and intuitive: 
just  to  make  prices  different  and  it  differentiates  the 
chances  of  providers  to  be  chosen  and  eventually 
realize the  fair allocation of  profits. Furthermore, the 
algorithm skillfully avoids endless increase or decrease 
in unit price. Thus, the price will fluctuate around the 
market price, which is acceptable for both consumers 
and providers. 
  Providers can choose not to adjust price every time 
one job is offered or not but start the algorithm every 
several jobs. However, if so, the providers are slow to 
react  to  the  market.  The  fairness  will  be  degraded 
accordingly. 
 
Competition-degree-adjusting  algorithm:  Like 
human beings, providers have diverse behavior. Thus, 
providers with various CDs coexist in a computational 
grid.  The  more  conservative  ones  are  relatively  less 
competitive  than  the  more  aggressive  ones.  They 
always keep unconfirmed jobs in their job queues and 
tend to lose potential jobs because of being unable to 
bid.  Most  likely,  these  jobs  are  offered  to  the  more 
aggressive  ones.  As  a  result,  fairness  among  all  the 
providers  is  hard  to  achieve.  Moreover,  the jobs  that 
could  have  been  done  by  the  conservative  ones  may 
bring  the  aggressive  ones  not  only  profit  but  also 
penalty, of course, which results from deadline missing. 
A  wise  provider,  whether  a  conservative  or  an 
aggressive  one,  should  never  hold  its  attitude  toward 
competition if things like that happen. It will adjust its 
CD according to the situation that it perceives. Thus it 
is  the  main  objective  of  the  CD-adjusting  algorithm. 
The following pseudo code describes the algorithm and 
the time complexity of this algorithm is O (1): 
 
//Every time the penalty increases 
1 if Rp >= THp and CD >= e then 
2 CD¬CD - e; 
3 endif 
//Every time a certain interval such as 1 day 
1 if Rp<THp and RJ >= THJ and CD <= 1 -e then 
2 CD¬ CD+e; 
3 endif 
 
  Here, Rp is the ratio of penalty to profit and RJ is 
the ratio of jobs that the provider does not bid for. THP 
and THJ are thresholds for them, respectively. If one 
rate  gets  above  its  threshold,  CD  is  adjusted 
accordingly at the step of  e. As can be seen, the check 
of Rp is not only timelier but also prior. The reason is 
that the rate of penalty to profit is a more obvious index 
to providers. Thus, Rp is checked every time and the 
penalty increased, whereas RJ can be checked regularly 
at a little longer interval such as 1 day. 
 
Resource  and  cost  management  scheme:  The  cost 
and  incentive  estimation  scheme  for  computational J. Computer Sci., 8 (4): 538-544, 2012 
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grids is implemented using the J2EE environment. The 
system is designed as three applications. They are grid 
server, resource provider and consumer. The grid server 
application is designed to handle the authentication and 
scheduling operations. The resource provider application 
is designed to provide shared resources to other nodes. 
The consumer application is used to access the resources. 
The  applications  are  interconnected  using  the  remote 
method  innovation  techniques.  The  resource  provider 
allocates the resources to the consumer with reference to 
the scheduling scheme provided by the grid server. 
  The  cost  estimation  and  incentive  estimation 
scheme is designed with the priority information. The 
supply  and  demand  factor  is  used  for  the  cost 
estimation  process.  The  cost  is  increased  due  to  the 
demand  factor  and  the  incentive  is  increased  with 
reference  to  the  supply  factor.  The  priority  factor  is 
decided by the provider and the consumer during the 
resource  request  process.  The  proposed  scheme  also 
considers the network delay factors. 
 
Grid server: The grid server application is designed to 
carry  out  the  administrative  operations.  The  user 
management  and  authentication  tasks  are  handled  by 
the grid server. This system integrates the scheduling 
process in the grid server application with the support 
of the autonomous information from the provider and n 
consumer  applications.  The  resource  allocation  is 
carried out in the grid server application. 
 
Consumers:  In  this  study,  only  consideration  of 
computation-incentive  jobs  is  made,  where  all 
communication/networking  overheads  can  be  ignored 
.All  jobs  are  independent  of  one  another.  The  K 
Consumers altogether have  n jobs to execute in time 
period  T.  The  Consumers  first  submit  job 
announcement  to  the  computational  grid.  A  Job 
announcement  includes  the  information  of  job  length 
and  job  deadline.  Job  length  is  an  empirical  value 
assessed  as  the  execution  time  of  the  job  on  the 
designated  standard  platform.  Job  deadline  is  a  Wall 
clock  time  by  which  a  consumer  desires  a  job  to  be 
finished expressed as a number between 0 and T. Thus, 
a job with length = 10 and Deadline = 100 means that 
the job’s execution takes 10 time units on a designated 
standard computer and it  must be finished 100 times 
units after the common base time 0. 
 
Providers:  From  the  scheduling  viewpoint,  each 
resource  provider  is  modeled  with  three  parameters: 
Capability, job queue and unit price. Capability is the 
computational  speed  of  the  underlying  resource, 
expressed  as  a  multiple  of  the  speed  of  the  standard 
platform. The job queue of a resource provider keeps an 
ordered set of jobs scheduled but not yet executed. Each 
job,  once  it  is  executed  on  a  resource,  will  run  in  a 
dedicated mode on that resource 
  Without  time-sharing  or  preempting,  a  provider 
charges for a job according to its unit price and jobs 
length. Unit price refers to the price that the resource 
offers for executing to its unit price and job length. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  We  formulate  job  scheduling  in  a  sustainable 
market-like  computational  grid  as  a  double-objective 
optimization  problem  to  optimize  incentives  for  both 
consumers and providers. As the problem is at least NP-
complete,  development  of  an  incentive-based 
scheduling  scheme  IB  with  heuristics,  using  a  P2P 
decentralized  scheduling  framework  is  done,  this 
scheme has the following features: (1) Each consumer 
or provider elaborate makes scheduling decisions, (2) 
All  scheduling  algorithms  are  local  to  a  resource 
provider and (3) Three market instruments, that is, job 
announcement,  price  and  CD,  are  employed  and  the 
former two circulate in the grid. 
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